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The Economic  Value of
Public Relations Expenditures:
Food Safety and the Strawberry Case
Timothy J. Richards and Paul M. Patterson
Food  safety  has  become  an  important  issue  affecting  public  health  and  grower
profits. Outbreaks offoodborne illnesses are typically accompanied by press accounts
of the incident and a decrease in demand. This study estimates the short- and long-
run impacts of adverse and positive information delivered through print media on
strawberry grower profits. Positive information may arise as part of the promotional
efforts of grower associations. It is found that adverse information reduces grower
profits, but that positive information can partially offset their effects. It is suggested
that grower groups could redirect funds used for promotion to food safety initiatives.
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Introduction
Growers  and  their commodity  associations  are  fully  aware  that  an outbreak  of a
foodborne  illness  can  cause  irreparable  harm  to  the  public's  perception  of  the
wholesomeness  of their product.  However, little is known of the exact cost to producers
of such incidents,  and  less  is known of the value  of efforts  used  to  counteract  the
negative press that invariably results. For example, California strawberry growers, who
experienced  two such incidents in  1996 and 1997,  estimated the cost of the latter at
some $40 million, but this was admittedly  only a rough estimate.  Beyond the loss of
product that is actually found to be contaminated, the full cost includes damage done
to a product's reputation with consumers as part of a safe, healthy diet. Such changes
in consumers' perceptions may be long lasting, widespread, and very difficult to reverse.
To complicate matters, the source of the damage may emanate from one small firm in
a fragmented, atomistic industry, while all growers are made to suffer.
As growers evaluate the costs and benefits of adopting new production methods and
techniques, accurate measures of these costs must be developed in order to quantify the
benefit of more intensive monitoring of possible contaminants.  In the past, such efforts
at private evaluation would not have been necessary, but as the federal government
considers imposing new industrywide regulations, growers and grower organizations are
developing  guidelines  for  self-regulation.  In  the  event  that self-regulation  fails to
prevent future outbreaks, more detailed information on the costs of such incidents also
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can be used to quantify the benefits to any defensive action taken by a commodity board,
such as the California Strawberry Commission  (CSC), in the aftermath of a disease
outbreak. To the extent that a product's "clean reputation" is a public good, an analysis
of the costs and benefits of trying to dispel consumer concerns provides a measure of the
amount that a group of growers, through their association, should be willing to spend
on an industrywide system of contamination control irrespective of any new government
regulation.
Growers already underwrite extensive advertising and promotional expenditures by
commodity organizations  such as the CSC. Using these tools to counteract the effects
of negative publicity,  however,  is not likely  to be effective  due to the different  ways
consumers  process  information  from  advertising  and  from the  seemingly  objective
news media (Lord and Putrevu). Although advertising offers benefits of a high degree
of message  control and repetition (Kotler), an increasing  body of research  questions
advertising's effectiveness, as it tends to desensitize its audience with repetition (Tellis;
Lipman).  Sales promotion also has the potential to erode brand equity as consumers
become  conditioned  to  expect  deals  on their  favorite  products  (Davis,  Inman,  and
McAlister). Publicity,  on the other hand, is often believed to enjoy a credibility advan-
tage, especially if the source is considered objective and unbiased (Levy; Salmon et al.).
In fact, there are many possible explanations for the differential impact on behavior of
positive and negative information.
Mizerski summarizes the research on these explanations into three classifications:
(a) surprise and frequency  of use, (b) ambiguity and uncertainty, and (c) differences in
causal attribution. In a consumer demand context, the first category reflects the notion
that negative information reaches a market infrequently, so this "surprise value" tends
to be regarded as more credible than a single positive message. However, this notion has
little empirical  support.  The  second  explanation  holds  that negative  information  is
somehow  less  ambiguous  than positive  information,  and so  has  a greater  effect  on
behavior. This theory, again, has had only limited empirical support. Mizerski, however,
provides more rigorous conceptual and experimental support for the third explanation-
attribution theory.
Attribution theory (Kelley) represents  an explanation of the way decision makers
respond  to the behavior or signals provided by others, whether they are individuals,
organizations,  or any stimulus provider.  Such signals are regarded  as being credible
representations  of the true intentions of the provider if their cause can be attributed to
interests of the provider that go beyond  self-interests  and reflect a wider concern for,
perhaps, other individuals or society as a whole (Bemmels; Sparkman and Locander).
Determinations  of causality are, in turn, made on the basis of three factors: (a) con-
sensus, (b) distinctiveness,  and (c) consistency (Kelley).  If everyone  in the provider's
environment behaves the same way (a consensus),  or gives the same signal, then the
signals are likely to be viewed as credible.  However, if the provider gives a signal that
is unique to that individual (distinctive), then the cause of this signal is more likely to
be attributed to self-interests,  and thereby be  less  credible.  Similarly,  if a signal  is
inconsistent with prior behavior,  then the cause is more likely to be  viewed as self-
interest and the signal will be less credible. For example, if a firm consistently tries to
cover up potentially harmful incidents, then claims to the contrary for all such incidents
in the future will be given low credibility.
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In the current application, therefore,  attribution theory maintains that people are
far more likely to believe and to act on information from a usually reliable source that
could potentially run counter to their own interests. In contrast, mollifying information
from a vested interest,  such as the CSC, will be given low credibility and will not be
acted upon.
Among the early experimental work, Richey, McClelland, and Shimkunas found that
positive  initial  impressions  of individuals  are  easily  reversed  with  some  negative
information, whereas negative initial impressions are both difficult to reverse and tend
to persist even with new positive information. Further, Swinyard and Ray report the
results  of an experiment wherein individuals who  are labeled as "charitable" by Red
Cross canvassers are more likely to donate to the cause in the future than those who are
not so labeled. The analogy to negative media information about a potential foodborne
disease outbreak is clear.
This analysis applies an empirical economic model based in attribution theory that
seeks  to quantify grower losses due to foodborne  disease outbreaks and estimate the
benefits of defensive media activities. An application of this approach to disease out-
breaks in strawberries in 1996 and 1997 demonstrates  not only the value of avoiding
future incidents, but also the return to public relations expenditures  eperintended  to "control
Ithe  spin" created by the media. In this sense, the source of the negative demand shock
is not the outbreak itself, but rather the exposure of the public to negative information
about the commodity or information that reduces the public's "perception of safety" in
consuming strawberries. Similarly, defensive  public relations activities  create poten-
tially offsetting sources of information that improve this perception of safety. Including
measures of both of these variables in a dynamic model of demand provides  estimates
of both long- and short-run effects of each type of information.
In the section that follows, we provide a brief narrative of the events surrounding the
strawberry disease outbreaks in 1996 and 1997, including, most importantly, how these
events were covered in the media. The next section presents a simple conceptual model
of how consumers incorporate both positive and negative information provided by these
media reports into their decision making. We then describe an empirical model that is
used to estimate the effect of each information type on market demand and to calculate
the resulting impact on producer welfare. In this model, negative and positive shocks
to demand cause retail prices to change and, through a Muth-type equilibrium displace-
ment model, prices and quantities supplied at the grower level. Each of these variables
is then incorporated into a simulation model of grower surplus which is used to calculate
the welfare effects,  both in the short and long run, of the shocks to demand. Conse-
quently, this study is able to produce an estimate of the economic damage caused by the
release  of news that may have influenced consumers to question the safety  of eating
strawberries. Because it takes into account the effect of both positive as well as negative
news, the study also provides some insight into the value of defensive public relations
activities taken by grower associations and, ultimately, potential measures taken by
growers to prevent future disease outbreaks. We conclude by drawing some implications
of these results for the potential role of grower associations in overseeing and funding
these preventative measures.
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Background on Disease Outbreaks
Linked to Strawberries
Although outbreaks of foodborne diseases linked to produce have been reported by the
Centers for Disease  Control (CDC)  periodically  since the early  1980s, the first such
incident concerning strawberries in the sample period covered by this study surfaced in
May  of 1996.  In late May,  some  300  people  in nine  states  complained  of diarrhea,
vomiting, weight loss, fatigue, and muscle aches-symptoms  subsequently attributed
to infection with the cyclospora parasite (Boston Globe). Initially, the Texas Department
of Health proclaimed that California strawberries "were almost certainly the source" of
the cyclospora, but laboratory tests conducted by the CDC could find  no evidence  of
cyclospora contamination in strawberries (Portland  Oregonian). It was not until some
four  weeks  later, in July  1996,  that the  CDC and  the Ontario  Ministry  of Health
released a statement exonerating strawberries and placing the blame more squarely on
imported  Guatemalan  raspberries.  Despite this  revelation,  the initial  damage  had
already been done; some stores reported reductions in strawberry sales of up to 30% for
at least three weeks following the Texas announcement (Washington Post).
Almost exactly  a year later, the CDC reported another series of cyclospora cases,
but this time the link to imported raspberries was established much earlier. However,
in March  of 1997,  198 Michigan  schoolchildren and teachers  contracted  Hepatitis  A
from eating a frozen dessert made from contaminated  strawberries.  Here, the source
was clear and particularly easy to trace. Contrary to the laws governing the National
School Lunch Program,  the dessert's maker, Andrew  and Williamson  Sales Co., had
acquired strawberries in Mexico and sold them to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA). As  a result,  the  firm and its principal  owner,  Fred Williamson,  were sub-
sequently indicted on 47 charges of making false statements, making false claims, and
one count of defrauding the United States (Kraul). Initial claims by the CSC put the cost
of lost strawberry  sales resulting from the negative publicity surrounding this case at
$15 million-a figure  that was later raised to $40 million,  but still subject to much
debate.
Growers'  chances  of recovering  economically  from this incident  and of preventing
others  in the  future  depend  in large  part  upon  the  ability  of  the  CSC  to  dispel
consumers' perceptions  of domestic strawberries  as a food with a substantial risk of
contamination. This ability, however,  depends upon consumer trust in the CSC given
its vested interest in selling more  strawberries.  Attribution theory provides a sound
logical basis from which to assess the credibility of the CSC and its responses to these
incidents.
A Conceptual Model of Responses  to
Positive and Negative  Publicity
Although the psychological and experimental bases for attribution theory are relatively
well established (Mizerski), the implications for economic behavior are less clear. The
usual approach is to assert that the demand for a commodity is a function of both the
positive and negative information received  regarding its attributes, but to leave the
question of which type of information dominates to empirical study (Swartz and Strand).
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Chang and Kinnucan, however, use attribution theory to motivate their expectation that
negative information should exert a disproportionate influence on demand, but they do
not develop an economic explanation for this asymmetry.
Consider the case where the utility derived from consuming the attributes (Z) of a
product is a function of the information (N) formed of those attributes over time. In a
steady-state equilibrium, no new information arrives, so the perception of each attribute
does not change and utility is also at a steady-state level. This occurs at an information
state N*. Suppose new information arrives that causes the perception of one particular
attribute  (food  safety,  or the  absence  of disease  or illness-causing  contaminants)  to
change from this reference  level to a different level while the perception  of all other
attributes  is held constant.  Call the new information state N.  Negative information
refers to the case where the new perception of safety is lower in the new information
state compared to the reference level (N  - N*  < 0), whereas positive information causes
the  perception  to  rise  (N-N*> 0)  above  the  steady  state.'  Given  a  well-behaved,
increasing,  concave utility function defined  over the product and its attributes, it  is
apparent not only that the change in utility from forming this new negative perception
of safety is negative and vice versa, but also that the incremental loss in utility domi-
nates the gain in utility from receiving positive news on the safety attribute.2 This is the
prediction of attribution theory. Using a variation of Chang and Kinnucan's extension
of Swartz and Strand's utility-based approach to valuing multiple types of information
about product attributes, this utility function can be written as
(1)  U (XZ-)  ;=  U(X-(Zi()))  if N>N*
U(Xi(Zi(N-  N*)))  = U(Xi,(Zi()))  ifN < N
where Xi is the quantity of product i; Zi is a vector of attributes of product i; N  is the
current state  of consumers'  perception  of the safety of the product, which  can either
improve existing perceptions of the product (2N >N*) or detract from them (N < N*);
and N* is the steady-state or reference  safety perception.  Given this specification and
the curvature assumption above, then it must be the case that
dU (2)  d
dN
dU+  rau ][axijazi  if>N*
dN  eX' ad) Zi  aA  )
dU-  iU  ax  i t  Zj  if N >N*
d  t  ax,  ax,-az  , aN*
1 Note that this definition does not imply a negative  marginal utility to information, because consumers  are likely better
off with information about potentially harmful product attributes, but simply that utility falls if new information causes a
negative impression to be formed, or rises if the perception of a product attribute improves.
2 Additional assumptions required here are that consumers receive information costlessly, that it is available to all con-
sumers, and that the interpretation of new information is unambiguous.  Other assumptions of instantaneous adjustment of
information  states and perfect credibility of information  sources are made to simplify the presentation of the theoretical
model, but are tested, albeit indirectly,  in the empirical model to follow.
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Figure 1.  Marginal utility of positive and negative information
and from figure 1 it is also clear that \dU+ldN I  < IdU-/dN I, or, in other words, a wors-
ening of the perceived  safety in consuming the product will dominate an equal-sized
positive increment in perceived safety. So, whereas Mizerski develops the psychological
basis for attribution theory, its predictions  are the natural outcome  of well-behaved
preferences.  Few of the empirical  models of negative and positive publicity, however,
take this preference structure into consideration.
Empirical Model of the Value of
Disease Information
The proliferation of legislation designed to protect growers of fruits and vegetables from
unsubstantiated claims of chemical and bacterial contamination suggests that there is
a need for economic research on the effects of such negative publicity on grower welfare.
Although this legislation is a relatively recent phenomenon, there have been significant
cases where a contamination, a disease outbreak, or simply the release of new scientific
research results have adversely affected consumer demand for a product.3 Among the
3 This is commonly known as "veggie hate crime" legislation.  Texas beef growers' unsuccessful lawsuit of Oprah Winfrey
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first of these cases to be investigated, Swartz and Strand develop the logic underlying
(1) in a model of purely negative information regarding a keptone contamination of the
James River oyster beds in the 1970s. Their proxy variable for negative information
consists  of a weighted sum  of negative  print media  articles  appearing  in the  local
Baltimore market pertaining to the contamination.  The weights are estimates  of the
probability that a given story will be read. This variable, however, does not allow for the
potential differential effects of positive and negative media exposure.
Recognizing that such incidents are usually met with strategic responses either by
governments interested in maintaining the public safety of the food supply, or by private
firms  with a vested interest in preventing  lost sales,  Smith, van Ravenswaay,  and
Thompson estimate  the effects  of both  negative  and positive  media articles  on the
demand for milk following the 1982 heptachlor contamination of milk on Oahu. Using
a J-test procedure to determine the appropriate news-variable specification, they reject
models containing both types of information together in favor of including only negative
publicity. This result, they argue, supports Weinberger and Dillon's claim that negative
information dominates a similar amount of positive information-a claim that follows
from  the model  of utility developed  above.  They  also  explain the  insignificance  of
positive information as evidence that dairy processors lack credibility due to their vested
interest in maintaining product sales.
Chang and Kinnucan take the separation of positive and negative information one
step further in a model of Canadian butter demand. By considering separate variables
measuring negative information about the effect of dietary cholesterol on the likelihood
of heart disease  (Brown and Schrader) and positive information from generic butter
advertising, they estimate the ability of promotion to overcome negative media reports.
Although it is difficult to compare the relative impacts of two variables measured in
different ways, the negative information elasticity is an order-of-magnitude  greater
than  the  advertising  elasticity  in  absolute  value,  suggesting that  industry  efforts
are  only  partially  successful  in  counteracting  reductions  in demand  from  adverse
media exposure. However, despite defining both negative and positive information in
terms of stocks rather than flows, Chang and Kinnucan  do not consider the relative
dynamic effects of either.4 Nonetheless, the methods used in these studies to quantify
information  flows  are of great potential use in valuing investments in publicity and
media relations.
For example, Brown and Schrader construct an index of consumer information about
the connection between cholesterol and cardiovascular health by counting the number
of medical journal articles  on this topic over a multi-year period. Articles that argue
against  a  relationship  between  cholesterol  and  health  are  subtracted  from  those
claiming otherwise to produce a cumulative  "net" information variable. This index is
used in a model of shell-egg demand to show the effects of cholesterol information on the
demand for eggs.
The information index used here differs in several respects. First, this study considers
the number of articles in popular media outlets, rather than the academic literature.
Information disseminated through medical journals is likely to take a long time to reach
consumers, and even then may be confusing and inconclusive. Media articles, however,
4 Chang and Kinnucan report results of tests that reject an exponential distributed lag in an advertising variable, but no
others appear to have been tried.
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convey information  (even if incorrect)  immediately to  consumers, thereby  changing
consumer behavior shortly after dissemination.
Second, Chang and Kinnucan recognize that information must be regarded as a stock
variable since it accumulates over time and decays with memory loss and obsolescence.
Negative information accumulates  as a weighted sum of each period's number of net
negative articles, where the weights are the proportion of total articles in each period
defined as "negative." Given the performance of this variable in Chang and Kinnucan's
research,  we construct similar indices for both positive and negative  media articles.
Although this procedure implicitly assumes that articles from different media outlets
have equal information content, the errors that are introduced are likely to be random,
thereby producing unbiased estimates. 5
Third, this study does not impose the assumption that positive information exactly
offsets negative information. Other studies (Chang and Kinnucan; Brown and Schrader;
Smith,  van Ravenswaay,  and  Thompson)  develop  an "information  index" in which
positive and negative articles offset one another to produce a net positive or negative
index value. Attribution theory, on the other hand, suggests that consumers are likely
to place more weight on negative information than positive. Smith, van Ravenswaay,
and Thompson suggest adding the number of positive and negative articles together,
reasoning that the negative impression toward a product is reinforced by all types of
publicity, whether the message itself is positive or negative. However, this approach is
not adopted here because the assumption that consumers ignore a valuable source of
information  is not  tenable if the underlying assumption  is that consumers  remain
rational. Using an index of net negative information allows these previous studies to
capture the effect of negative publicity in a parsimonious way, but it constrains market
responses to positive and negative articles  to be the same, so this study constructs a
separate  index for both negative and  positive  articles.6 Consequently,  this analysis
estimates the effect on grower surplus of news of a disease outbreak given estimates of
the response of demand to both negative and positive media.
Specifically, a Muth-type equilibrium displacement model (Kinnucan, Xiao, and Hsia)
is  used  to  calculate  the  net grower  price  effects  of new  negative  or  positive  r  siti  news
regarding strawberries. The equilibrium displacement approach specifies  a simple, yet
complete, model of a strawberry market equilibrium consisting of equations for demand,
supply, retail-farm price linkage, and market clearance. The reduced-form  solution to
this  system  expresses  the  change  in  grower  price  resulting  from  changes  in  each
exogenous demand factor-including the release of both positive and negative informa-
tion. These shocks cause changes in grower price, commodity supply, and, ultimately,
producer surplus. In general terms, the monthly market model for K fresh fruits consists
6Other studies attempt to define the information content specific to each article through a subjective rating system (Smith,
van Ravenswaay, and Thompson), but these calculations  are arbitrary and likely create a systematic error due to the fact
that they attempt to mimic individuals' cognitive processes in receiving information. These processes are far too complex and
diverse to reduce to a subjective rating variable. Although a complete content analysis of each article would be preferable to
the approach adopted here, there is insufficient information on each article to conduct such an analysis.
6A reviewer points out that these article indices are but imperfect measures of positive and negative information, which
are unobservable or latent variables. As such, a structural latent variable method, such as Joreskog and Goldberger's Multiple
Indicator  Multiple Cause  (MIMIC) model, may be used  to correct for  the measurement  error inherent in our approach.
However, this method requires variables that are acceptable indicators of the latent variables (Gao and Shonkwiler). No such
variables were available in the monthly data frequency used in this study.  Therefore, the estimated parameters may be biased
to the extent that our indices measure negative and positive information with error.
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of the following equations representing retail demand (3), farm supply (4), retail-grower
price transmission (5), and market equilibrium (6):
(3)  dln(P)  = Fdln(Q)  + Mdln(Z)  + 01dln(B)  + 02dln(G),
(4)  dln(X)  = Esdln(W),
(5)  dln(W)  = Tdln(P),
(6)  dln(Q)  = dln(X).
Using the price  and  quantity responses  from this model,  Just, Hueth, and  Schmitz
provide an expression for the change in producer surplus for good i:
(7)  APS i = SfPiQ dln(Wi)(1  + 0.5dln(X)),
where W is a K-dimensional vector of grower prices, X is a K-dimensional vector of farm
supplies, P is a K-dimensional  vector of retail prices,  Q is a K-dimensional  vector of
monthly arrivals, S f is the grower's share of the retail dollar, Z is a vector of exogenous
factors, B is the amount of new negative information about strawberries in month t, and
G is the amount of new positive information in month t. Both are vectors because they
appear in all inverse-demand equations. Among the parameters, F is a matrix of price
flexibilities of demand, Oi are "shock flexibilities" for a shock of type i (good news or bad
news), M is a matrix of demand flexibilities with respect to the exogenous factors, Es is
a diagonal matrix of supply response elasticities,  and T is a diagonal matrix of price
transmission elasticities.7 The elements  in (3)-(6)  are solved  simultaneously  for the
change in retail price by substituting (6), (5), and (4) into (3). Simplifying the result then
provides a reduced-form expression for the change in retail price in response to a change
in either type of information shock:
(8)  dln(P) = (I  - FET)-  Mdln(Z)  + (I  - FEST)-0 1dln(B)
+ (I  - FEST)-12dln(G).
The resulting change in retail price is then used to calculate the change in farm price
and, in turn, the change in farm supply through (6) and the change in producer surplus
through (7). While Kinnucan, Xiao, and Hsia develop this model in order to calculate the
returns  to promotion  and  health information,  as well  as to  measure  the  extent  of
spillovers between promoting commodities that are related in demand, present concern
is with the grower impact of a negative shock to retail demand, and the value of defen-
sive public-relations  activities.
7The elasticity of price transmission is given by T i =  (ai +  eb)/[oi +  S ieb +  (1 - S/)ea], where ois the elasticity of substitution
between farm and marketing inputs, ea is the elasticity of supply of farm inputs,  eb is the elasticity of supply of marketing
inputs, and S
f is the farm share of the retail dollar (Gardner).
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Consistent with (3) above, the sensitivity of strawberry prices to both negative and
positive demand shocks  is estimated with an inverse, dynamic model of monthly U.S.
fresh fruit demand. An inverse demand model is appropriate in this case because, in
monthly data, supply is likely to be predetermined. Although supply is fixed each period,
consumer buying behavior tends to reflect habits, learning, and experience that persist
over time  (Blanciforti and Green;  Chen and Veeman;  Pollak). Specifying a dynamic
demand model to account for these effects is particularly important in this case because
the principal  effect of adverse publicity may be to break consumption  habits and to
instill new, unfavorable impressions of the good in consumers' minds. Produce items are
generally thought to be "experience goods" (Nelson), so establishing a brand reputation
for consistently high quality is difficult.8 Therefore, when this image is broken, it is
difficult to reestablish.
Although  there  is no  a priori information  to determine  the  specific  form  of the
dynamic effects of information on prices, it is likely the case that shocks to demand have
an immediate  impact that declines  slowly over time as consumers  either forget the
information received, or believe that the original cause has been corrected. Therefore,
the demand model uses an autoregressive structure in fruit expenditure share similar
to that of Blanciforti and Green. This specification allows for both long- and short-run
price effects, and long- and short-run responses to demand-side shocks.
In order to ensure that the demand response parameters estimated with this variable
are consistent with rational consumer behavior, all price, expenditure, and information
effects  are estimated in a system of fresh fruit demand equations.  Of the functional
forms  that  are  consistent with  consumers'  maximizing  income-constrained  utility,
Deaton and Muellbauer's Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model constitutes one
theoretically  plausible  specification.  The  advantages  of using this  specification  are
well known, as are its limitations (Green and Alston). Eales and Unnevehr argue that
one critical limitation of the original specification is its assumption of price exogeneity.
For many commodities, especially perishable ones, the quantity supplied is essentially
fixed in monthly data, so prices  adjust to clear the market  (Rickertsen). 9 Beginning
from a distance function analogous to Deaton and Muellbauer's PIGLOG expenditure
function,
(9)  lnD(u, q)  = (1-  u)ln(a(q)) + uln(b(q)),
Eales and Unnevehr define a(q) and b(q) as follows:1 0
8 An anonymous  reviewer draws a distinction between experience  attributes  and credence  attributes. While taste and
texture are experience attributes that may vary in small ways from shipment to shipment, the safety of a given product is
less clearly an experience  attribute. If a consumer becomes ill, he or she may not ascribe the illness  to one particular food.
Given assurances from government or private organizations on the safety of a particular product, consumers  simply expect
to not become ill from consuming the product, so safety is more of a credence attribute (Darby and Karni). In other words,
safety  is not  experienced,  but expected.  In this regard, safety is  more precisely defined  as a credence  attribute and is
consistent with the role of safety as described by Swartz and Strand.
9Conducting commodity-by-commodity Hausman tests for price exogeneity produces x
2 statistics of 10.781 for bananas,
5.461 for apples, 16.234 for grapes, 2.354 for strawberries, and 5.909 for oranges. The critical X
2value at a 5% level with 44
degrees of freedom, where the degrees of freedom are equal to the number of system parameters minus one, is 60.19. Thus,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for any commodity. Consequently, the inverse model is appropriate for this
problem.
lO  This distance function is assumed to be linearly homogeneous,  concave, nondecreasing in q, and decreasing in u (Eales
and Unnevehr).
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(10)  ln(a(q))  = a,  = E  ln(qj)  + 0.5 E  ¥  yiyln(qj)ln(qi);
J  j  i
ln(b(q))  = P  I  qiPj  + ln(a(q)).
J
Substituting  these  expressions  into  the  distance  function  (9),  differentiating  with
respect to quantities, and solving for each of the i budget shares leads to an estimable
system:
(11)  w i = ai +  yijln(qj)  + Piln(Q),
where  wi is the budget share of product i, and Q is a total quantity index, commonly
approximated with Stone's quantity index. Moschini, among others, argues that linear-
izing the AIDS model (or the IAIDS in this case) with Stone's index leads to inconsistent
parameter estimates. However, Moschini also shows that creating a corrected  version
of this index by scaling all component quantities provides a "proper" index that performs
as a very close approximation  of the nonlinear IAIDS.  Consequently,  this study uses
Moschini's  corrected  Stone's quantity index.  Restrictions  implied by utility maximi-
zation require:
EC  °i  =1,  Y-i  ,  = °  E  p= o,
i  i  i
yij  =°,  and  Yi  = yj,.
Although Green and Alston derive elasticities that are consistent with a nonlinear
AIDS specification,  Chalfant's  expression for price and scale flexibilities in the linear-
approximate version are given, respectively, by
(12)  f,  = -6j  + (Yij  + i)l  i;
fi  = -1  + Pi/i,
where di  is Kronecker's delta. In the inverse model, negative cross-flexibilities indicate
gross quantity substitutes, whereas  positive cross-flexibilities  suggest that the goods
are quantity complements.1l  Similarly, products with scale flexibilities below - 1.0 are
termed necessities,  while a scale flexibility above  - 1.0 indicates the good is a luxury.
Estimating (11) in this example, however, requires that three other considerations
be taken into  account.  First,  the demand  model must  allow for seasonality.  This  is
n
' In general,  the metric for flexibility is the normalized  price of a good,  or its price divided by expenditures,  which is
proportional to its marginal utility. In an inverse demand model, therefore, flexibility refers to the sensitivity of the marginal
utility derived from a good to changes in its quantity. If a 1%  increase in the consumption of a good results in a greater than
1%  increase in its marginal utility, then Eales and Unnevehr define the good to be inflexible (p. 261). Scale flexibility, on the
other hand, is best understood  in quantity space. If the movement from one consumption bundle  to another can be decom-
posed into a utility-constant  substitution, and then a proportionate change in all quantities, the scale flexibility refers to the
change in marginal utility from consuming a particular  good when the consumption  of all goods changes proportionately
(Eales and Unnevehr). Therefore, goods with a scale flexibility less than -1 must be necessities,  whereas luxuries are greater
than -1.  Intuitively, if an individual receives more of all goods, then the marginal utility of consuming any one of them must
fall. Further, there will be a proportionately greater fall in marginal utility of those goods for which the individual has little
need to consume more-or the ones that he or she consumes  first, necessities.
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accomplished  by incorporating  a series of monthly dummy variables.  Second, the good
news (G) and bad news (B) variables are incorporated in linear form. Third, the response
of product share to changes in all explanatory variables is assumed to be governed by
an autoregressive process, the order of which is to be determined by the data. With each
of these considerations,  the demand model is written as a system of inverse demand
equations:
(13)  Wit  =  E  OmWi,t-m  +  O(i0+  E  °kLk  + aiBBt + aiGGt)
m  k
+ E  Yiln(qjt)  + Piln(Qt)  +  it,
where 6 is a vector of autoregressive parameters, L is a set of monthly dummy variables,
B  is the  index  of bad  media  information  regarding  strawberries,  G is  its  positive
counterpart,  Q  is the total quantity index,  and e  is a random error  term. Although
researchers often invert elasticities to approximate  flexibilities, and vice versa for use
in simulation models,  Huang (1994) provides empirical evidence of the error that this
simplification may cause. For this reason, the market equilibrium model uses directly
estimated flexibilities in the producer surplus model. Estimates of the fresh fruit system
are obtained using monthly price and quantity data for each of the major fresh fruits
over a period that includes both of the recent disease outbreaks  attributed to straw-
berries.
Data and Methods
Specifically,  the  strawberry  price  and  quantity data  for  this  study are  from  U.S.
Department of Agriculture  (USDA)  and U.S.  Department  of Labor/Bureau  of Labor
Statistics (BLS) sources. Because annual per capita consumption aggregates published
by the USDA cannot capture the immediate effects of information shocks to the market,
monthly arrivals reported in the USDA/Market  News Service's Fresh Fruit  and Vege-
tableArrivals  in Western Cities and Fresh  Fruit  and Vegetable Arrivals in  Eastern  Cities
for  1995-97  provide  the  quantity  data.  Arrivals  to  six  eastern  markets  (Atlanta,
Baltimore,  Boston,  Detroit,  Philadelphia,  and Pittsburgh)  and six western markets
(Chicago,  Dallas,  Los Angeles,  San Francisco,  Seattle,  and  St.  Louis)  are  recorded,
providing 432 panel observations.
AlthoughArrivals include more markets than those listed here, the excluded markets
had  several months  where  strawberry arrivals  were less  than one standard unit of
measurement  (100,000  pounds).  With the declining  relative importance  of terminal
markets represented by arrivals data, there is some concern over how well arrivals data
correspond  to  amounts  estined  for  retail  consumption.  However,  monthly  CSC
shipment data include movements of all strawberries at a national level, and therefore
must equal consumption plus loss in transport. The average correlation between arrivals
to the 12 markets in the sample and national CSC shipments is 91.6%.  Thus, we are
confident that  arrivals  represent a  close  approximation  to  the amounts  ultimately
consumed at retail. Moreover,  because the arrivals data represent supply that is not
previously committed under contract, fluctuations in these marginal shipments cause
changes in the market price.
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Monthly arrivals data also permit the estimation of any seasonal effects on demand.
Strawberry prices, reported on a dollar/pound retail basis, are supplied by the BLS Con-
sumer Price  Index:Average Price  Data,  but for only nine months of the year. Shipments
during October, November, and December are insufficient to determine a representative
price, so only nine months per year remain in the sample for estimation purposes.
Assuming fresh fruit consumption is weakly separable from other foods  and other
goods, the set of alternative products includes  apples, bananas,  oranges, and grapes.
Arrivals for each of these are available throughArrivals,  and retail prices are also found
in the  BLS Average Price database.  As in the strawberry  case,  each price  series  is
expressed on a real, per pound basis and is measured  at the retail level.
With data on both farm (or FOB) and retail prices, it also would have been possible,
and preferable, to estimate the retail-farm price transmission elasticity. However, in the
absence of FOB prices, the transmission elasticity is calculated by assuming plausible
values for the elasticity of supply of marketing services  (10.0), the elasticity of supply
of strawberries  (from 0.01  to  5.00), the elasticity of substitution between  farm and
marketing inputs (0.0),  and the farm share of retail value (USDA, Fresh Fruit  Prices
and Spreads). With these parameters, Gardner's formula (see footnote 7) is used to cal-
culate a synthetic elasticity value. Because there is some question as to the  tionelasticity  of
supply of strawberries in monthly data, the change in producer surplus due to favorable
and unfavorable  news articles  is calculated over  a range of values from  r  =  0.01  to
As  = 5.00. The econometric model in (13) is estimated with least squares by pooling over
time periods  and  markets. A fixed-effects  method  controls  for heterogeneity  among
markets, but the market-specific parameters are not of immediate interest, and so are
not presented. (They are, however, available from the authors upon request.)
The  number  of favorable  and  unfavorable  e  articles  per  month  is  determined  by
searching the top 50 newspapers in the U.S. through the Dow Jones  News Service under
the key terms "strawberry," "disease," "hepatitis," and "cyclospora." By searching the top
newspapers by circulation,  this procedure not only ensures a far broader coverage  of
U.S. consumers compared to Brown and Schrader's approach, but also minimizes the
likelihood that the medium will  add a source of uncertainty to the  credicebility  of the
message. After reviewing an abstract of the article, or the full article itself, a determin-
ation is made as to whether the article creates a favorable or unfavorable perception of
the safeness of consuming strawberries.12 Although it is well known that the impact of
a story varies by its location within the paper and on the page, the Dow Jones News
Service does not provide  sufficient  information to rate articles on this basis. Conse-
quently, the articles are assumed to be relatively homogeneous in exposure.
As attribution theory predicts, an article's impact will depend not only upon exposure,
but on the credibility of the source. However, adjustments for credibility made at the
recording stage would be arbitrary and subjective. Rather, in order to conduct statistical
tests of the predictions  of attribution theory, each article is recorded  as creating an
unambiguous positive or negative impression of strawberry safety. Although arriving
at a definitive assessment of each article may seem to be arbitrary, upon reviewing the
12 This method approximates as closely as possible the impression a typical consumer will take from the article. Adding
further specificity to this measure would introduce bias to the extent that the researcher's interpretation differs from that
of consumers. Any article that could not be classified as either positive or negative, such as a recipe or harvest report, could
not be included in the indices.
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articles it became immediately  clear as to the conclusion to be drawn from each.  For
example, the initial articles written in May of 1996 following the cyclospora outbreak
were unambiguously negative,  as each cited the Texas Department  of Health's claim
that California strawberries  were "almost certainly" the source of the disease.  Later
articles, however,  cast doubt on this conclusion and pointed instead to imported rasp-
berries as the cause. These were coded as positive because they so clearly contradict the
initial  claims.  By coding each  article one  way  or the  other, the  econometric  model
determines, statistically, whether consumers act as if the message is credible or not and
if, as a result, producer surplus should rise or fall.
Producer  surplus values are calculated under two simulation scenarios using data
over the entire sample period: the first assumes only unfavorable media exposure, while
the second allows for both good news and bad news regarding strawberries. In each case,
the amount of information is defined  as the cumulative total number of articles from
January  1,  1995 through October 31,  1997. The grower loss or benefit of each type of
information is calculated for each  month, converted to a present value at January  1,
1995  as an annuity  at a  5%  rate of interest, and then expressed in November  1997
dollars through a future value  calculation. By comparing the producer surplus values
that result, the study is able to isolate the value of providing "defensive" information to
the market to counter the negative effects of adverse media information. The results of
each of these simulations are presented and interpreted following a brief discussion of
the demand model estimates.
Results and Discussion
Although the primary concern of this study is with the effect of positive and negative
media exposure on strawberry producer surplus, estimates of media's effects on both
strawberry and other fruit demand are of some interest. From a broader perspective of
the entire U.S. fruit and vegetable sector, spillover effects from strawberry news on the
demand for substitute products may serve to mitigate the damage caused to the straw-
berry industry itself.
To this end, table 1 shows all own- and cross-elasticity estimates as well as goodness-
of-fit measures. Although the sample period is relatively short, the model appears to fit
the data quite well, as the R2 values for each equation are over 90% and all own- and
cross-price flexibilities  are  significantly different from  zero. Whereas negative cross-
price elasticities indicate complementarity, in an inverse demand model, negative cross-
price flexibilities  suggest q-substitutability.  Clearly,  table  1  shows that all pairs  of
commodities are indeed q-substitutes, meaning that as the supply of one increases, the
price  of the other is expected to fall, albeit less than proportionately.  The fresh fruit
group is, however,  less homogeneous  with respect to scale flexibility estimates. While
apples, bananas,  and grapes are all scale-flexible,  and strawberries  and oranges are
scale-inflexible in the short run, all goods are scale-flexible in the long run.
Further, for all commodities except apples, lagged own-price variables are significant
at lags of two periods.1 3 Importantly, all roots of the characteristic  equations implied by
13 Detailed parameter estimates for the entire model are available from the authors, as table 1 summarizes these results
in terms of the estimated flexibilities.
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this lag structure are bound by the complex unit circle, which suggests that prices follow
a convergent process toward equilibrium following a shock-converging  only after an
initial overshot of the steady state. One explanation for this "overshooting" may be the
tendency  for markets  to  overcompensate  for unexpected  news.  Given  an uncertain
situation, risk-averse buyers  and sellers tend to err on the side of conservatism  and
expect the damage  to be worse than it actually is. On the other hand, initial reports
simply may prove to be wrong. In the case of the 1996 cyclospora scare, blame initially
placed  on contaminated  strawberries  was later redirected toward the true  culprit-
imports of Guatemalan  raspberries.  This behavior would explain a large price  drop,
followed by a gradual return to some long-run equilibrium. Irrespective of the cause of
the price dynamics found here, the long-run parameters  are derived by dividing their
short-run counterparts  by (1-  E2  m), where  0m  denotes the coefficients  of the  auto-
regessive process.
These flexibility estimates also show that both negative and positive media exposure
have significant effects on commodity prices, but, as attribution theory suggests, their
impact is not symmetric. Consumers appear to react strongly to negative information
about  a product,  but they are  less responsive  when presented  with favorable  news.
Because many of the positive articles included here were corrections of previous misin-
formation, this suggests that once the bad news is made public, the damage has been
inflicted and  little can be  done  to reverse  it.  It may  also be the case that favorable
information provided by the CSC is viewed as "nonunique" or to reflect its own interest,
and  so  is  discounted  heavily  by  consumers.  Rather  than  release  such  defensive
communiques  directly, therefore, it is clearly in a commodity board's best interest to
filter this information through organizations consumers  perceive as objective, such as
universities or government research  agencies.
It is also interesting to compare the relative magnitudes ofthe short-run negative and
positive information flexibilities. Whereas a rise in the weighted, cumulative index by
one more negative article (a 45% increase, on average) in a typical month is likely to
reduce strawberry prices by over 29%, a positive article (a 76% increase) will help the
CSC recover 26% of the strawberry price.  However, if the percentage change in infor-
mation stock is held constant across the two scenarios  (perhaps if the CSC adopts an
equivalent tit-for-tat strategy), the CSC will only be able to raise prices by 15%. Thus,
if  the  CSC  seeks  to mount  an  intensive  campaign  to  counter the  negative  media
exposure, it will have to almost double the negative  exposure provided by the popular
media.  Because of the autoregressive  model structure,  this approach gives estimates
of both the long- and short-run effects of information and price changes.
Given the sum of the lag coefficients is approximately 0.90, adjustment to the steady-
state  price  level  is relatively  rapid  since it  is nearly  complete  within  two  periods
(months). Consequently, there is little difference between the short- and long-run flexi-
bilities. However, both the short- and long-run estimates are significantly higher than
those implied by demand elasticities reported for similar commodities  (Huang 1985;
Lee, Brown, and Seale; Richards). Some of the difference between the current and prior
results is likely due to the fact that this study uses monthly data, whereas most pre-
vious studies use annual data. Further, quantity-dependent demand systems will suffer
from misspecification bias when prices, in fact, adjust to clear the market following a
shock to supply.
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Table 2.  Loss of Producer Surplus Due to Unfavorable Media Exposure and
the Value  of Media Defense:  10% Shock to Number of Articles
Short Run ($ mil.)  Long Run ($ mil.)
Bad  With  Value of  Bad  With  Value of
Scenario  News  Defense  Defense  News  Defense  Defense
= 0.01  -232.656  -109.493  +123.163  -273.424  -128.649  +144.775
= 0.10  -227.585  -107.369  +120.216  -266.978  -126.002  +140.976
= 0.50  -207.424  -98.612  +108.812  -241.975  -115.232  +126.743
=  1.00  -187.800  -90.056  +97.744  -218.559  -105.170  +113.389
= 2.00  -161.250  -78.634  +82.616  -189.173  -97.585  +91.588
= 5.00  -140.828  -92.257  +48.571  -83.518  -49.705  +33.813
Notes: All cases represent cumulative cost or benefit  of all media  exposure from January 1995 through
October 1997. Producer surplus values are in millions of current dollars.
With a short-run price flexibility of -0.35,  and a long-run flexibility of -0.39 (table 1),
large changes in supply are required to cause prices to change significantly. This rigidity
is consistent with the strong substitute relationships that the cross-flexibility estimates
suggest. If consumers regard other fruits as close substitutes for strawberries, they will
switch to other products rather than pay much higher strawberry prices. Similarly, the
short-run price flexibility in response to negative articles is -0.65, while the long-run
flexibility is -0.72. This estimate implies that one more negative article at the height
of the 1997 scare (a 6.7% increase) would have caused a long-term price reduction of
approximately $0.31 per carton (1.9%), suggesting that strawberry prices are relatively
sensitive to even a small amount of bad news. Such estimates of the incremental cost
of negative information are helpful in guiding growers' efforts to counter bad publicity
through their own media programs.
Most of the impact  of positive media exposure  occurs  in the period in which it is
released.  Similar to the negative-information  case, prices are inflexible in response to
positive news, with short- and long-run flexibilities of 0.34 and 0.38, respectively (table
1).  As explained above,  the fact that these flexibilities are  lower than their negative
counterparts suggests that equal percentage changes in each type of exposure will cause
prices to fall. Examining the cross-flexibilities in table 2, however, shows that news of
disease outbreaks related to strawberries  does not necessarily reduce the demand for
all fruits. In fact, the price of each alternative fruit rises on the news of a strawberry
disease scare, but falls in response to positive strawberry information.  Growers  as a
whole, therefore, are not necessarily worse off as a result of negative media exposure.
A more complete  analysis of this issue (one that is beyond the scope of this article)
would estimate a two-stage model including the demand for the entire fruit category.
If total fruit demand falls in response to negative information dominating positive, then
perhaps industrywide programs  are required rather than commodity-  and outbreak-
specific measures.  With respect to strawberry growers alone, however, long-run cumu-
lative impacts on grower welfare are more clearly shown by calculating the change in
producer profit rather than simply looking at changes in price.
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The simulation results in table 2 show the short-term and long-term effects of both
types of media information. To be able to compare the change in surplus that arises due
to changes in the amount of each type of information, an increment is defined as a 10%
rise in each with the other held constant. In the short-run scenario, strawberry buyers
do not completely adjust their buying behavior in response to the lower prices caused
by a disease scare, nor do they remember negative media information for more than the
current month.  To  the  extent that these  assumptions  are unrealistic, this  scenario
represents an understatement of the true loss to growers. This cost is also sensitive to
the extent to which growers and shippers respond to lower prices by supplying fewer
strawberries  to the market.  Specifically, the less elastic is supply, the more price will
fall in response to a shock to demand. Therefore, these simulations consider a range of
supply elasticities from 0.01 (highly inelastic) to 5.0 (very elastic). Assuming a very low
supply elasticity (0.01), short-run price and information adjustment, and focusing on the
case  where  consumers  are exposed  to only bad news, growers  lose  a total of $232.6
million over the sample period, or 19.6% of the total value of all shipments. Including
the effects of positive media reduces the total loss to $109.5 million, which implies that
positive information is worth $123.2 million in this case.
Under a scenario where growers and shippers are better able to adjust strawberry
supplies in response to price changes (supply elasticity = 1.0), the loss due to negative
information falls to $187.8 million and the net loss becomes $90.1 million, so the value
of spin control in this case is $97.7 million. Public relations officials at the CSC should
compare  this value to  the cost of mounting a  concerted  effort  aimed  at reassuring
consumers of the safety and nutritional value of strawberries through mass media. More
realistic  estimates  of this  value,  however,  take  into  account  consumers'  long-run
response  to both positive  and negative reports regarding the health implications  of
buying strawberries.
In fact, table 2 shows that the long-run effects are somewhat greater than the short-
run effects. Again assuming that supply is virtually fixed (a less tenable proposition in
the long run), the loss due to negative information rises to $273.4 million, and the value
of media  efforts  to  ameliorate  the damage  rises  to  $144.8  million.  Although  these
damage estimates are far higher than the rough estimates provided by CSC officials
during the 1997 scare ($40 million), they come closer as the assumed elasticity of supply
rises. Specifically, if the elasticity is 5.0 instead of 0.01, then the loss due to bad news
falls to $83.5 million, while a positive media response reduces this loss to $49.7 million.
Therefore,  the  value  of a  campaign  to  either  correct  misinformation  or  to  change
consumer perceptions is $33.8 million.14 Given even this most conservative estimate, it
appears that the amount spent by the CSC during the 1997 outbreak, which officials
estimate at roughly $250,000, was money very well invested. To be useful as a practical
guide to investing in media programs,  it is necessary  to demonstrate  how sensitive
these results are to changing the definition of a publicity response,  or how "news" is
quantified.
1 4 Notice that this definition of a long-run effect differs from that of Brown and Schrader. They consider the addition to a
cumulative  stock of "net negative  articles,"  whereas this  study treats  each new article  as  an independent  shock.  This
difference may be significant because  their approach implicitly  assumes that consumers become desensitized to bad news
as it accumulates-an  assumption that cannot be made in this case.
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Table 3.  Loss of Producer Surplus Due to Unfavorable Media Exposure and
the Value of Media Defense:  One Article Shock Simulation
Short Run ($ mil.)  Long Run ($ mil.)
Bad  With  Value of  Bad  With  Value of
Scenario  News  Defense  Defense  News  Defense  Defense
= 0.01  -899.335  -32.347  +866.988  -1,056.203  -37.980  +1,018.223
i = 0.10  -861.837  -30.527  +831.310  -1,006.814  -35.530  +971.284
T = 0.50  -714.526  -22.532  +691.994  -814.502  -24.761  +789.741
=  1.00  -570.818  -14.143  +556.675  -628.509  -13.389  +615.120
r= 2.00  -361.515  -0.486  +361.029  -347.125  +7.339  +354.464
= 5.00  +163.124  +263.324  +100.200  -126.225  -58.041  +68.184
Notes: All cases represent cumulative  cost or benefit  of all media exposure  from January 1995 through
October  1997. Producer surplus values are in millions of current dollars. Scenario assumes an average of
one more positive and negative news item per month.
Table 3 shows the change in producer surplus that results from defining an increment
to the stock of information due  to a single negative  or positive  article in an average
month.  Given the relatively  low number of articles  reaching the media each month,
these estimates are far higher than the scenario considered above. While both positive
and negative media have very large independent effects on surplus, the net effect is
relatively  small because  a single-article  change  represents  a far higher percentage
change for good news as opposed to bad news.  Specifically,  in the short run, the net
impact with inelastic supply is $32.3 million, rising to $14.1 million under an assump-
tion of unitary supply elasticity. In the long run, inelastic supply produces an estimate
very close to the "best-guess" numbers of CSC officials ($38 million), while the assump-
tion of unitary elasticity  ields a net cost of $13.4 million to growers.  Although these
results  also suggest that publicity is a good investment,  the question remains  as to
whether growers' money could have been put to an even better use.
Although it sounds cliche, in this case an ounce of prevention may indeed be worth
more than a pound of cure. Preventing a loss this large not just in revenue, but inprofit,
provides  ample justification for investing in an industrywide safety-control program.
The problem is that a disease-free  reputation  is a classic  example  of a public  good.
Because all growers benefit from this product image, but none can be compelled to pay
their individual benefit, the private market will fail to provide any protection at all. If
it is rational for one grower to be a "free rider," then it is rational for all to become free
riders.
However, commodity organizations were initially established to provide another type
of public good-generic commodity promotion. It seems natural, therefore, that commod-
ity groups could treat contamination  prevention as an equal and companion objective
to promoting their products. Mandatory  grower check-off fees  would fund inspectors
and industry-designed  standards that would  obviate the need for more  government
regulation  of growers.  In  the  strawberry  industry,  some  of the  largest,  vertically
integrated grower/marketers  have recognized  the fundamental truth in this logic by
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investing in their own Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) programs
(The Packer). To the extent that their strawberries are seen as close substitutes for all
others, however, they are still subject to the risk that one culprit will again damage the
buying public's image of strawberries as a safe and healthy food.
In fact, as a result of the 1997 outbreak, the CSC has taken steps in this direction
with the establishment  of a  food safety  director position.  While  the director has no
enforcement abilities, she has been successful in helping growers and shippers establish
systems of efficient traceback,  providing them information on existing sanitation and
hygiene standards, and is working toward industry-standard  HACCP programs. The
creation of this position is but one part of the industrywide  approach to maintaining
food safety, based on principles of grower/shipper self-interest and self-reliance that has
brought praise to the CSC from all corners of the fruit and vegetable industry.
Conclusions  and Implications
Whether beef growers  arguing the amount of damage  inflicted  by Oprah  Winfrey's
comments or strawberry growers placing a value on one individual's indiscretion, esti-
mates of profits lost due to a shock to an agricultural market are usually little better
than guesses. Accurate  information on these  costs is important to growers and their
associations in establishing the value of a defensive  response through promotion or
news releases-or  spin control.  This study develops a model designed to quantify the
effects of media reports of a disease outbreak on the profits of commodity growers. An
application of this model to the U.S. strawberry market from 1995-97 demonstrates that
these lost profits can be significant.
The approach taken in valuing negative media reports, and efforts to counter these
reports,  involves estimating a model  of strawberry demand that allows for the inde-
pendent effects of negative and positive news. The psychology of "attribution" suggests
that each type of news will have a different effect  on consumers, depending upon the
credibility of each source of information and that source's perceived vested interests in
making news widely known. Quantitative measures of  the amount of  either type of news
are developed by counting the number of positive and negative media articles appearing
in the popular media on a monthly basis. These shocks are allowed to persist over time
by specifying the demand model in inverse, autoregressive form.
Estimates  of this model show that positive  and negative media  articles have the
expected  effects  on  price,  but negative  reports have  a greater  effect  on price than
positive reports-exactly the result predicted by attribution theory. Simulations  of a
producer-welfare model that incorporates these elasticities find the loss due to bad news
regarding strawberries to range from $273.4 million to $83.5 million in the long run,
depending upon  the supply  elasticity assumptions  made.  Estimates  of the value  of
defensive media efforts range from $144.8 million to $33.8 million, which are both many
times the amount actually spent by the CSC during the most recent outbreak.
One  implication  of this  result  is  often  overlooked.  If  a product's  image  among
consumers as a safe and healthy alternative is considered a public good, then grower
associations  have an incentive to broaden their missions to include not only generic
commodity promotion,  but also to consider industrywide  efforts at preventing future
disease outbreaks. Individual firms' efforts to develop HACCP programs or to adopt new
Richards and PattersonJournal  ofAgricultural and Resource  Economics
production practices can be undermined by one individual who takes one risk too many.
Recognizing this fact, the CSC has taken steps to remind growers and shippers of their
responsibility to the integrity of the "California Strawberry" brand, and to assist them
in adhering to food safety regulations that cover all industry members.
Future research in this area  should recognize  the fact that negative and positive
impressions of the safety attributes of a particular food are latent variables and should
be explicitly identified as such. Structural  latent variable  models can be constructed
from annual  data that use  media indices  similar to those  developed  here  as  cause
variables and treat the numbers of foodborne disease outbreaks reported to the Centers
for Disease  Control  and the residuals  from a demand  system (Gao and  Shonkwiler)
as indicator variables.  With this MIMIC  approach, measurement  errors inherent in
the approach used here and elsewhere  would be held to a minimum. This approach,
however,  will  require  much  better  disease-reporting  data than  are  now  currently
available.
[Received November 1998;  final revision received May 1999.]
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